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I
t’s safe to say that the past few years have been interesting 
for the Federal Reserve System, particularly for the mem-
bers of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  Diffi-
cult decisions have been made:  The federal funds rate has been 
lowered to basically zero, and money has been distributed to 
various financial institutions in order to keep them solvent.
Such  dramatic  actions  have  drawn  unprecedented  levels 
of attention to the members of the FOMC and to the Fed-
eral  Reserve  System  more  generally.    Some  of  this  atten-
tion might have been good for the Fed.  Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke was even named Time magazine’s “Person of the 
Year”  in  2009  because  “he  didn’t  just  reshape  U.S.  mon-
etary  policy;  he  led  an  effort  to  save  the  world  economy.”     
That’s some pretty good press.
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the attention was unwanted.  Recall that 
in the spring of 2010—when the financial 
reform act was being put together—those 
who felt the Federal Reserve System was 
responsible for the financial crisis were 
calling for a reshuffling of the Federal 
Reserve’s structure and responsibilities.  
One proposal was to eliminate the supervi-
sory role of the regional Fed banks over the 
commercial banks within their districts.  
Another option was to make the regional 
bank presidents, who are now appointed by 
their districts’ board of directors, political 
appointees instead.  Both of these options 
were publicly criticized by the regional bank 
presidents and ultimately did not become 
part of the new law. 
One of the arguments against making  
the regional bank presidents political 
appointees was that such a move could 
ultimately reduce the range of ideas that 
are debated at each of the FOMC meetings.  
And since “thinking outside the box” is 
generally considered a good thing, reducing 
the range of voices in the FOMC meetings 
seems unlikely to improve monetary policy.  
In other words, disagreement among the 
FOMC members is something we might 
want to see more of and not less of.
But is there really that much disagreement 
among members of the FOMC?  It certainly 
seems so.  Read on for a simple decomposi-
tion of where some of this disagreement 
might be coming from.
Measuring Disagreement
From the perspective of the public, it may 
appear that there is little-to-no disagree-
ment among FOMC members.  Because  
it is relatively uncommon for a voting  
member to dissent, one might conclude  
that the members are in agreement about 
the relevant policy actions discussed at  
that FOMC meeting.
While dissenting votes are an indication  
of disagreement, they are a very coarse met-
ric for evaluating how much an individual 
member of the FOMC disagrees with the 
proposed policy actions.  By their nature, 
dissenting votes are either “yes” or “no.”  
There is no gray area.  As such, characteriz-
ing FOMC disagreement by whether a mem-
ber dissents provides very little information 
about the magnitude of disagreement that 
an individual member has about a given 
policy.  Perhaps a member is 60 percent in 
favor of the policy and 40 percent against 
the policy and, therefore, does not dissent. 
Should we, therefore, conclude that he or 
she exhibits no disagreement from the 
consensus view?  Also, at any given FOMC 
meeting, there are only four regional bank 
presidents who are able to vote and, thus, 
convey their opinion via a dissent.  The 
remaining eight regional bank presidents 
may disagree with the policy, but since they 
don’t have a vote, their disagreement cannot 
be observed by the public.
Therefore, we take a completely different 
approach to measuring disagreement—one 
that is not based on whether an individual 
casts a dissenting vote regarding a policy 
action.  We measure disagreement using 
internal forecasts made by each individual 
FOMC member in preparation for a subset 
of the FOMC meetings that occurred from 
1992 to 1998.  By taking this approach, we 
are able to make much finer measurements 
about the degree to which a specific member 
of the FOMC disagrees with other members 
regarding the state of the economy and, 
potentially, how much each disagrees with  
a proposed policy action. 
The data are based on those used for the 
semiannual monetary policy report to Con-
gress, made in February and July of each year 
since 1979.  Before each of these releases, each 
member of the FOMC makes a forecast of 
end-of-year nominal and real GDP growth, 
inflation and the unemployment rate.  The 
February forecasts are for the current cal-
endar year.  In July, two sets of forecasts are 
given: an updated forecast for the current cal-
endar year and a longer-horizon forecast for 
the next calendar year.  Once these forecasts 
have been collected from each member of 
the FOMC, the maximum, minimum and a 
trimmed range (based on dropping the three 
highest and three lowest values) of each of the 
four variables are included in the monetary 
policy report to Congress.
Unfortunately, the individual forecasts 
are not provided in the report when it 
is released.  However, a newly available 
data set, published last year by Berkeley 
economist David Romer, provides those 
forecasts made by individual members of 
the FOMC between February 1992 and July 
1998.
1  Until early summer of 2009, the only 
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of the aggregated information (that is, the 
maximum, minimum and the trimmed 
range) contained in the report to Congress.  
In contrast, this new data set provides 
not only the individual forecasts for each 
economic variable, but it also associates the 
forecasts with every member of the FOMC 
other than the chairman.
Although the data set is the richest source 
of information on the FOMC forecasts that 
is available to the public, the data set is 
limited in its duration.  Although FOMC 
forecasts have been made since 1979, the 
documentation of the individual forecasts 
doesn’t go back that far.  Very recently, the 
Board of Governors constructed a com-
plete series of the forecasts starting only as 
far back as February 1992.  In addition, a 
10-year release window has been enacted, 
limiting the most recent forecasts publicly 
available.  Our data, therefore, consist of 
the individual forecasts for each of the four 
variables, over three distinct forecast hori-
zons, over a seven-year span, made by each 
regional bank president and each governor 
other than the chairman.
Before characterizing the magnitude of 
disagreement and attempting to explain 
why such disagreement exists, it is impor-
tant to understand that the forecasts made 
by the FOMC members are not your typical 
forecasts.  The FOMC forecasts are “con-
ditional” forecasts.
2  Specifically, they are 
constructed conditional on a hypothetical 
future path of monetary policy (i.e., a future 
path of the federal funds rate or some other 
type of monetary policy).  In contrast, the 
typical “unconditional” forecast makes no 
such assumption about the future path of 
monetary policy.  Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis President James Bullard made this 
distinction clear in a speech last year when 
he said, “The FOMC members’ forecasts 
are made under appropriate monetary 
policy.”  In this framework, “appropriate 
monetary policy” is left to the discretion of 
the individual FOMC member construct-
ing his or her own forecast.  This induces 
disagreement among the members irrel-
evant of whether the members are form-
ing their forecasts based upon the same 
information—such as developments in the 
economy as a whole.  As such, our results 
on disagreement capture not only variation 
in the information and models the FOMC 
members are working with but also the 
variation in beliefs on what appropriate 
monetary policy should be, irrespective of 
those features.
With that caveat in mind, we define an 
individual’s forecast disagreement as the dif-
ference between his or her forecast fi and the 
median forecast M among all FOMC mem-
bers.  Consider Figure 1.  Here, we provide 
two box-and-whisker plots of the 18-month-
ahead forecasts made by the 18 members (six 
governors—one of whom is the vice chair-
man—and 12 regional bank presidents) of the 
FOMC at the July 1993 meeting: one for the 
inflation rate and one for the unemployment 
rate.  The median forecast is indicated by the 
center line within the box, the first and third 
quartiles are indicated by the edges of the box, 
and the “whisker” that stretches to the left and 
right provides a visual of the entire range of 
data.  Clearly, the inflation forecasts exhibit a 
much wider range of disagreement than that 
These box-and-whisker plots show the forecasts made by the members of the FOMC at their July 1993 meeting.  
The forecasts are for inflation (top) and unemployment for 18 months out.  The median forecast is indicated by the 
center line within the box, the first and third quartiles are indicated by the edges of the box, and the “whisker” that 
stretches to the left and right provides a visual of the entire range of data.  
SOURCE:  Economist David Romer’s web site: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/
Figure 1
Forecast Disagreement among FOMC Members

































































18-MONTH-AHEAD FORECAST IN 1993
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such as the presidents  
of the St. louis and  
cleveland Feds, have 
forecasts that differ so 
drastically despite the  
fact that, by and large, 
these members have 
access to the same data?
associated with the unemployment forecasts, 
but why?  And among the inflation forecasts, 
why do some members, such as the presidents 
of the St. Louis and Cleveland Feds, have fore-
casts that differ so drastically despite the fact 
that, by and large, these members have access 
to the same data?
In our analysis, we use straightforward 
regression techniques to try to parse some 
of the reasons why these differences exist.  
First, we ask whether the magnitude of the 
disagreement, measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between a forecast 
and the median forecast | fi – M | , can be 
explained.  Second, we ask whether the 
direction of the disagreement, measured as 
the sign (plus or minus) of the difference 
between a forecast and the median forecast, 
can be explained.  In each of these decom-
positions, we consider four factors: (1) varia-
tions in regional information, (2) the state 
of the national economy, (3) voting status of 
the member and (4) permanent effects that 
are specific to the individual.
3
We measure variations in regional 
information as the difference between the 
unemployment rate for the nation as a whole 
and the unemployment rate for the region 
associated with the FOMC member.
4  For 
those members who are governors, we treat 
the nation as their “region” and, hence, for 
them, this variable takes the value zero.  With 
this measure, we hope to capture disagree-
ment effects due to differences in region-
specific information among the members.  
Given the number of meetings that regional 
presidents have with local business leaders, it 
would not be surprising if they held different 
views about the economy, based upon such 
region-specific information. 
For ease of comparison, we measure the 
state of the national economy using the 
national unemployment rate.
We measure voting status using an 
indicator variable that takes the value one 
if the individual is a voting member at the 
time the forecast is constructed and zero 
otherwise.  With this measure, we hope 
to capture strategic differences among 
the regional bank presidents who form 
their forecasts differently when they are 
a nonvoting member than when they are 
a voting member.  The reason to consider 
this predictor is based on the observation 
that while the four voting regional bank 
presidents have the ability to express their 
disagreement by a dissenting vote, non-
voting members can only express their 
disagreement vocally at the FOMC meeting.  
And insofar as their forecasts express their 
views, these forecasts may exhibit more 
disagreement than when they vote.
Finally, we measure the permanent indi-
vidual effect by defining 14 distinct indica-
tors: one for each of the regional banks, 
one for the vice chairman and one for the 
remaining governors.  With these indica-
tors, we hope to capture those disagreement 
factors that are specific to the individual 
but not explained by observed economic 
data.  In our decomposition of | fi – M | , 
these indicators are designed to capture 
the individual specific “aggressiveness” of 
their disagreement irrespective of whether 
they are above or below the median.  In the 
second decomposition, these indicators are 
designed to capture an effect that is akin 
to calling someone an inflation hawk (or 
dove): terms used to characterize whether 
an individual is seen as wary of increases in 
inflation (or decreases) at all times irrelevant 
of the flow of recent economic data.
For brevity, we focus exclusively on the 
18-month-ahead forecasts of CPI-based 
inflation and of the unemployment rates.  
Results for nominal and real growth are 
similar in spirit.
The Determinants of Disagreement
We begin by describing our results for 
predicting the magnitude—rather than the 
direction—of the disagreement.  For the 
inflation forecasts, nearly all of the predic-
tive content came from the individual- 
specific permanent effects.  Apparently, 
those individuals who tend to be in 
greater—or lesser—disagreement with the 
consensus do so for individual-specific rea-
sons.  Voting status, and both the regional 
and national economic conditions, seemed 
to play no role in determining the magni-
tude of forecast disagreement.
Not surprisingly given Figure 1, we find 
that on average across the available data, 
the St. Louis, Cleveland and even the Dallas 
Feds tended to exhibit the largest levels of 
disagreement on inflation.  Quite intuitively, 
we also find that the vice chairman tended 
to be one of the most consensus-oriented 
members of the FOMC.
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forecasts, there does seem to be a signifi-
cant effect due to the state of the national 
economy.  As the national unemployment 
rate rises, the degree of disagreement among 
the members’ unemployment forecasts 
increases just a bit.  At some level, this 
makes sense.  When unemployment is high, 
there tends to be a great deal of uncertainty 
in the economy.  If there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in the economy, it is intuitive 
that there might be greater uncertainty 
about policy among the FOMC members 
and, thus, greater disagreement among their 
forecasts.  In addition, as was the case for 
the inflation forecasts, the St. Louis Fed con-
sistently tends to exhibit one of the largest 
levels of disagreement and the vice chair-
man tends to exhibit one of the smallest 
levels of disagreement.
The results for directional disagreement 
tend to be a bit more interesting.  In particu-
lar, the results indicate a clear tendency of 
the FOMC members to treat their inflation 
and unemployment forecasts as trading off 
one another.
For example, those individuals who 
tended to forecast lower levels of inflation 
than the consensus also tended to forecast 
higher levels of the unemployment rate than 
the consensus.  A good example of this is the 
Minneapolis Fed, which had a tendency to 
forecast lower inflation than the consensus 
while simultaneously having a tendency to 
forecast unemployment to be higher than 
the consensus.
This tradeoff can also be seen in the 
regional effects.  Apparently, as a given 
region’s unemployment rate rises above the 
national unemployment rate, the regional 
bank president tends to have a lower infla-
tion rate forecast than the consensus while 
simultaneously having a higher unemploy-
ment rate forecast than the consensus.  
Again, the rationale for this regional effect 
is intuitive.  If members observe particularly 
low unemployment in their region, they 
would naturally expect inflation pressures 
in the future as households spend more of 
their income.  Similarly, if members observe 
higher unemployment in their region, one 
might conjecture spillover effects to the 
economy as a whole, implying that the 
future inflation rate will be lower.
And while not nearly as strong an effect as 
those already discussed, the tradeoff appears 
in both the national and the voting effects.   
As either the national unemployment rate 
rises or members switch from being nonvot-
ing to voting, their inflation forecast tends 
to be lower than the consensus and their 
unemployment forecast tends to be higher 
than the consensus.  Unfortunately, there 
does not seem to be an obvious reason for 
why such a tradeoff should exist between  
the inflation and unemployment forecasts 
due to voting status or the national unem-
ployment rate.
Figure 2
Differences between Regional and National Unemployment
In the study of disagreement on the FOMC during the 1990s, a connection could be seen between a region’s unemploy-
ment rate and a member’s forecasts on the economy.  For example, as a given region’s unemployment rate rose above the 
national unemployment rate, the regional bank president tended to have a lower inflation rate forecast than the consensus 
while simultaneously having a higher unemployment rate forecast than the consensus.  If that pattern still holds true today, 
disagreement among the FOMC members is probably high and on the rise, given that the range of the deviation in the rates 
across the country (as seen above) is larger than it’s been for the past 20 years.  
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations
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  1  The data are available at David Romer’s web 
site: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/
  2  See Faust and Wright.
  3  For simplicity, we define an individual by 
his or her position and not by name.  For 
example, we treat the St. Louis Fed Bank 
Presidents Thomas Melzer and William Poole 
as one “individual” because they were both 
presidents, during this time frame, of the  
St. Louis Fed.
  4  There are no true measures of regional eco-
nomic well-being where the region is defined 
by the Federal Reserve bank divisions.  We 
follow Meade and Sheets and construct our 
own measure of regional unemployment by 
using population-based weights of state-level 
unemployment rates.  For some regions, 
this is trivial because the region definition 
includes full states.  For other regions, like 
St. Louis’, the region includes several partial 
states.  For these divisions, we use county-
level population figures taken from the  
1990 census.
ReFeRenCes
Bullard, James.  “Discussion of Ellison and 
Sargent: What Questions Are Staff and FOMC 
Forecasts Supposed to Answer?”  Presented at 
the European Central Bank conference  
10th EABCN Workshop on Uncertainty over 
the Business Cycle, Frankfurt, March 30, 2009.
Faust, Jon; and Wright, Jonathan H.  “Efficient  
Forecast Tests for Conditional Policy Fore-
casts.”  Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 146, 
2008, pp. 293-303.
Meade, Ellen E.; and Sheets, D. Nathan.   
“Regional Influences on FOMC Voting  
Patterns.”  Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, Vol. 37, 2005, pp. 661-77.
Conclusion
These historical results beg the question:  
Do we expect there to be much disagree-
ment among today’s FOMC members?
Because most of today’s FOMC mem-
bers were not members in the mid-’90s, it’s 
hard to say anything definitive.  However, 
even though the individual effects might be 
very different now, one can conjecture that 
the regional effects remain similar.  If so, 
then the results indicate that, as regional 
variation in the unemployment rates 
increases, one would expect an increase in 
the directional disagreement of the FOMC 
members.  Specifically, one might expect 
those regional bank presidents with unem-
ployment rates higher than the national 
rate may become increasingly dovish and 
those with rates below the national rate may 
become increasingly hawkish.  As evidence 
of such, in Figure 2 we plot the deviation 
of each regional unemployment rate from 
the national unemployment rate.  As of the 
June 2010 employment figures, the range of 
these deviations is the largest it has been for 
the past 20 years, suggesting that not only 
might there be considerable disagreement 
among today’s FOMC members, it might be 
increasing.
Hopefully, that’s a good thing. 
Michael W. McCracken is an economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Go to http://
research.stlouisfed.org/econ/mccracken/ to see 
more of his work.  Chanont Banternghansa 
provided research assistance.
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For more on this subject, read the 
working paper “Forecast Disagreement 
among FOMC Members” by Michael 
McCracken and Chanont Banterng-
hansa.  See http://research.stlouisfed.
org/wp/2009/2009-059.pdf
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